Peer-reviewed article

Arctic Review on Law and Politics
Vol. 15, 2024, pp. 3–24

Small States in World Politics: Norwegian Interests and Foreign Policy Challenges in the Arctic

Beate Steinveg

Faculty of Social Sciences, Nord University, Bodø, Norway

Abstract

Small states are perceived to be subject to the will of great powers in the international system. Yet, small states – such as Norway – also have interests they pursue through various means. This article features an inventory of the Norwegian government’s main foreign policy and Arctic policy interests, and examines the rationale behind these interests from a domestic and an international perspective. The article highlights Norway’s challenges in the Arctic, including balancing between Russia and NATO, Norway’s bilateral relationship with the United States, dealing with China as an emerging Arctic stakeholder, and Norway’s ambivalent relationship with the European Union concerning the Arctic. The analysis draws on theorizing about small states in world politics and Putnam’s two-level game. The latter facilitates the examination of how the Norwegian government must reconcile domestic and international priorities simultaneously, and how the negotiation of foreign policy is conducted as a balancing act in national and international arenas.

Keywords: Norway, small state, state interests, foreign policy, Arctic policy

Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, Faculty of Law, UiT The Arctic University of Norway

Received: October 2022; Accepted: October 2023; Published: January 2024

Correspondence to: Beate Steinveg, e-mail: beate.steinveg@nord.no

Citation: Beate Steinveg. “Small States in World Politics: Norwegian Interests and Foreign Policy Challenges in the Arctic” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 15, 2024, pp. 3–24. http://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v15.5125

1 Introduction

Located on NATO’s northern flank, Norway has a strong interest in keeping the High North peaceful,¹ and the High North is “the most important peace project” for the government.² As such, Norway is “far more than we generally realize, in a unique position internationally in terms of its dependence on a robust international legal order,”³ which is “a key objective of Norway’s interest-based policy.”⁴ Norway’s foreign policy has been described as small state realism – the need for protection and weight attributed to international law – and small state idealism – the belief that Norway can and should make a difference through engagement, such as peace diplomacy.⁵ This article gives a thorough overview of Norway’s Arctic policy priorities and interests, and asks: What is the rationale behind Norway’s Arctic policy, and does it contribute to strengthening Norway’s position internationally?

The international legal order referred to by the Norwegian government was established after the Second World War, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity.⁶ The United States (US) was a driving force behind the international institutions and rules that were developed at the time, but other major powers as well as small states considered that their interests would be best served by having a predictable international arena governed by the rule of law.⁷ Indeed, Norway’s membership in the NATO alliance since 1949 has increased Norway’s security, although limiting its room for maneuver, and decades with a rules-based international order have been favorable to Norway.⁸

However, Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 24, 2022 has been described as a Zeitenwende – a major historical turning point – and the war has been interpreted as a clear indication that the global architecture is transforming into a multi-order world.⁹ Within a multi-order global architecture, the primary global governance dynamics will be within and between different international orders, rather than between multiple sovereign states.¹⁰ Apart from the continued existence of the American-led liberal international order, the new multi-order world will include the Chinese-led “Belt and Road order” and the Russian-led “Eurasian order.”¹¹ The balance of power has therefore shifted – a development that started prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The international regimes and rules that have comprised the liberal world order are also being undermined and challenged by western liberal democracies.¹²

These systemic changes make for an interesting study of the instruments available for a small state in pursuit of its interests. Norway is an appealing case, not only because of its geographical location and alliance membership, but also because of its self-imposed national identities and resource potential. This article understands the international structure as the distribution of power between great powers (polarity), the pattern of great power rivalry (who are allied and rivals), and Norway’s geopolitical position in relation to great powers.¹³ From this starting point, the article highlights four challenges for the Norwegian government in the Arctic, which are spurred and shaped by developments on the international system level.¹⁴ These challenges have emerged over time, resulting from the gradual movement in the post-Cold War era from a US-led unipolar order towards a more bi-/multipolar order,¹⁵ but have been actualized by Russia’s war on Ukraine.¹⁶

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, it outlines the theoretical framework applied for the analysis of Norway’s foreign policy and how Norway pursues its interests in the Arctic, given systemic changes and super/great power interests. This is followed by an account of Norway’s Arctic policies and chairmanship priorities in regional bodies for cooperation. The article then discusses the rationale behind Norwegian policy priorities and interests, focusing on three broad categories, and the article concludes by summarizing challenges and opportunities in Norway’s foreign policy approach to the Arctic.

2 Theoretical perspectives

Realist theory is predominately confined to great powers, and small states are largely considered subject to the power and will of great powers in an international system characterized by anarchy and competition, and where states’ foremost priority is to secure sovereignty and survival.¹⁷ Small states’ room for maneuver is impacted by their geographical positioning in relation to the great powers,¹⁸ and the Norwegian government has pointed to increased great power rivalry as posing an especially potent risk for small states.¹⁹ This article follows Long, and defines a small state relationally, rather than materially or ideationally, as: “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship.”²⁰ Long challenges the assumption that the leaders of small states simply “do what they must,” and rather focuses on how small states can shape agendas and advance their interests.²¹ This article examines the extent to which Norway’s Arctic policy is dictated by great powers and shaped on the international system level.

Central questions are what conditions in the relationship between small states and great powers affect the likelihood that small states can achieve their goals, and which strategies they can adopt in pursuit of their goals.²² Long constructs an ‘analytical scorecard’ to assess how the combination of three relational conditions creates constraints and opportunities for small states. The first is policy divergence, which is the distance between the small state’s goals and the great power’s policy.²³ The second is relational issue salience – whether the small state’s policy matters to the great power.²⁴ The third is preference cohesion – whether there is a significant degree of consensus within decision-making circles in the great power about how to address the issue.²⁵ Applying this perspective enhances our understanding of how a small state formulates its foreign policy, and the strategies available for a small state in pursuit of its interests. Norway is an example of how a small state can exploit diplomacy in a way that enhances its image and role,²⁶ and has actively pursued diplomatic and multilateral efforts to ensure low tension in the High North. These endeavors were aided by the post-Cold War liberal international order, and a central question is whether Norway can continue to pursue its foreign policy along these lines, given systemic level changes.

This relates to an ongoing debate in the study of states’ foreign policy, namely the extent to which it is influenced by national or international factors.²⁷ Naturally, the foreign policy of smaller states is dictated to a larger extent by international structures than that of great powers. The primary interest in this article is how small-state foreign policy and interests are impacted by the international system and domestic policy conditions. However, seeing how there is a large degree of cross-party agreement on foreign policy in Norway, the main emphasis is on how Norway’s interests are pursued, and its foreign policy conducted, in light of systemic level changes.²⁸ In its examination of how Norwegian domestic policymaking and international affairs are intertwined, this article draws on Putnam’s two-level game.²⁹ Specifically, to consider the significance of diplomacy and Norway’s interaction with other actors when expressing its national interests and formulating foreign policy.

Putnam argues that the politics of international negotiations can be perceived as a two-level game. At the national level, there is interplay between groups who pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians who seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.³⁰ At the international level, national governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.³¹ This framework is useful, not only for analyzing international negotiations, but also for analyzing how foreign policy is formulated and carried out in sovereign states that are also interdependent and how domestic politics can be important in determining and shaping a state’s foreign policy.³² Putnam further asserts that it is a mistake to assume that the leader of a state only cares about popularity with the national constituency, or only about international gains with no fear of facing domestic constraints.³³ On the contrary, decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.³⁴ Thus, studying the interaction between states as impacting foreign policy-making through a relational approach can be useful.³⁵

One hypothesis is that during the bipolar Cold War international system, there was less room for maneuver for the Norwegian government both at the international and domestic levels. The unipolar American-led order that followed provided new opportunities for Norway in pursuit of its interests, and the opening of relations between the west and the east facilitated the opportunity for cross-border collaboration between North-Norwegian entities and Russia. The question is whether the new multi-order global architecture will divide the Arctic, and whether the region will be impacted by an emerging Sino-American bipolar order. If so, this will again limit Norway’s room for maneuver. This article contributes to the literature on IR by analyzing how the relational aspect between the national and international levels comes into play in the formulation of Norway’s Arctic policy, and extrapolating how we can understand small states’ interests and objectives in international politics.

3 Materials and methods

This section presents reports to the Storting (white papers to the Norwegian Parliament), High North and Arctic strategies, and priorities in Norwegian chairmanship programs for the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Nordic Council, and the Nordic Council of Ministers that are relevant for the forthcoming discussion of Norwegian interests in the Arctic.

3.1 Norwegian High North and Arctic strategies

The High North was defined as the most important strategic area for Norway, and became an important new foreign policy dimension for the Norwegian (Labor) government in 2006 when Jonas Gahr Støre – then foreign minister, now prime minister – launched The Norwegian Government’s Strategy for the High North.³⁶ This strategy followed the 2005 white paper Opportunities and Challenges in the North,³⁷ the aim of which was to pursue a more active High North policy in order to position Norway in the post-Cold War international arena, ensure political stability and sustainable development in the region, and safeguard Norwegian interests.³⁸ This shift towards the north was driven by both internal and external forces. Internally, the economic opportunities in the region were becoming increasingly apparent, and externally, international conditions were changing following the more visible impacts of climate change, the potential for resource extraction, and Russia’s re-emergence as a central actor in the region.³⁹

At the time, the United States was paying limited attention to the Arctic region. This is reflected in the High North strategy, which barely mentions the US, but which has a strong emphasis on Russia. Specifically, the 2006 High North strategy acknowledges that Norway is now “dealing with a different Russia from the one that emerged in the international arena in the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,” and states that Norway welcomes developments taking place in Russia as the country finds its place in the European cooperation after decades of authoritarian rule and isolationism.⁴⁰ While there is uncertainty related to how Russia will develop economically, politically and societally, Norway’s policy towards Russia is based on “pragmatism, interests and cooperation.”⁴¹ It is therefore evident that system level changes after the end of the Cold War had an impact on Norway’s approach to the High North, and the country’s priorities in the region.

The 2006 High North strategy states that “predictability and long-term perspective have been the hallmarks of Norway’s policy in the north for many decades,” and introduces the High North as a new dimension of Norway’s foreign policy. This new dimension includes increased activity and a stronger strategic focus on maintaining longstanding Norwegian interests, developing cooperation with Russia, and gaining acceptance for the importance of sound resource management, efforts to protect the environment and address climate change.⁴² The 2006 strategy highlights regional forums, e.g. the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Arctic Council and bodies for Barents cooperation, as valuable for directing attention towards Norway’s interests.⁴³ Thus, the Norwegian government responded to international system level developments, e.g. the re-emergence of Russia as a central actor in the region, with an emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation through institutions and regimes. Such an approach appears to have been beneficial for a small state that shares a border with one great power and is dependent on another great power for its security.

The period after 2005, with the Labor party in power, was characterized by continuity, with the same priorities in the Norwegian High North: managing peaceful relations in the region, developing the relationship with Russia, and promoting Norwegian interests through regional bodies for collaboration. However, this was also a time of both uncertainty and diplomatic efforts in Arctic international relations. Uncertainty illustrated by Russian president Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, where he made the Arctic part of his project to restore Russian great power status, and the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed of the magnetic north pole.⁴⁴ Diplomatic efforts illustrated by the signing of the Ilulissat declaration in 2008 by the five Arctic coastal states (the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway), in which they underlined their commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the basic governing constitution of the region and to resolving any remaining issues cooperatively amongst the Arctic states.⁴⁵

The 2006 High North strategy was followed by New Building Blocks in the North (2009),⁴⁶ The High North Initiative – Status October 2010,⁴⁷ and the white paper High North – Visions and Strategies (2011).⁴⁸ When the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Erna Solberg took office in 2013(-2021), there was a slight shift in attention towards soft security issues and regional development, and Norway’s Arctic policy was given a more holistic approach. This was manifested by the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries becoming involved in the formulation of the Arctic policy, in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁹ The Conservative government published Norway’s Arctic Policy in 2014,⁵⁰ and Norway’s Arctic Strategy – Between Geopolitics and Social Development in 2017.⁵¹ These documents came at a time of more alarming developments at the system level, in particular with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Still, the 2017 Norwegian Arctic Strategy states: “Despite Russia’s violation of international law in Ukraine, and Norway’s response to this, it is vital that Norway and Russia work together to address key challenges in the north,” and underlines that Norway’s relationship with Russia is a constant and important element of Norway’s Arctic policy.⁵²

New Growth, Proud History – The Norwegian Government’s Ocean Strategy was also published in 2017, with the main objective being to contribute to the “greatest possible sustainable value creation and employment in the ocean industries”.⁵³ The strategy acknowledges that Norway is a considerable ocean economy, emphasizes Norway’s longstanding ocean traditions, with fishing and shipping having been important industries for centuries, and recognizes that the petroleum industry has been an additional important source of value creation and employment in Norway.⁵⁴ Thus, this strategy relates to Norway’s interests related to shipping and the seafood, maritime, and petroleum industries. Finally, the white paper People, Opportunities and Norwegian Interests in the North was issued in 2020.⁵⁵ Taken together, these documents illustrate the significance of the Arctic for Norway, and express Norwegian interests in the region.

3.2 Bodies of regional and international cooperation

In 1987, Soviet president Gorbachev held his Murmansk speech, in which he outlined how tension in the Arctic could be reduced and cooperation advanced, and pointed to challenges that no Arctic state could address alone, e.g. environmental concerns such as the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl and oil spill at sea.⁵⁶ In the years that followed, new forums and networks for regional cooperation were established, that reflected the changing political climate after the end of the Cold War.⁵⁷ Norway is a member of these, which include the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council, in addition to the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, which notably were established in a different, Cold War, context.

The Nordic Council, established in 1952, consists of 87 elected members from national parliaments who are nominated by the party groups. One of its main purposes is to contribute to making the Nordic region one that people want to work and live in. The Nordic Council of Ministers, created in 1971, is the official body for formal interparliamentary cooperation in the region, and consists of eleven ministerial councils and the Ministers for Nordic Cooperation. The presidency for both the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers is held for one year and rotates between the five Nordic states. Norway held the presidency of the Nordic Council in 2018, which emphasized health technology and patient security; education, inclusion, and mobility; the environment and maritime safety; and defense and security. For the Norwegian presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2022, the priority areas were: a green Nordic region; a competitive Nordic region; and a socially sustainable Nordic region.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was launched in 1993, and its members are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Russia, and the European Commission, in addition to several observers. The chairmanship rotates biannually between Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Norway held the chairmanship in 2011–2013 and 2019–2021. For the 2011–2013 chairmanship, Norway’s priorities were: sustainable economic and industrial development; environmentally safe and climate-friendly development based on knowledge; and the human dimension. Norway’s priorities for the 2019–2021 chairmanship were: health; people-to-people contact; and knowledge.

The BEAC, which is a forum for intergovernmental cooperation at the foreign minister level, was supplemented by a cooperation protocol establishing the Barents Regional Council. This protocol was signed by representatives from 13 regional entities in Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, in addition to the Indigenous peoples groups the Sami, Nenets, and Veps. The intention behind these two bodies for Barents cooperation is to contribute to stability and prosperity in the region, by supporting and promoting cooperation and sustainable development. Norway held the chairmanship for the Barents Regional Council in 2009–2011, with the priority areas: stronger political cooperative structures in the Barents region; sustainable framework conditions; development of entrepreneurship; development of cooperation in the field of culture; and Indigenous peoples.

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 and is the salient intergovernmental forum for cooperation in the Arctic region between the eight Arctic states (the United States, Russia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark), six Indigenous peoples’ organizations, and non-Arctic observer entities (non-Arctic states, intergovernmental, interparliamentary, and non-governmental organizations). The Arctic Council’s objective is to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction on common Arctic issues, in particular sustainable development and environmental protection. The Arctic Council’s permanent secretariat is in Tromsø, Norway. It should be noted that the Arctic Council does not deal with matters of military security, which means that its mandate, as a soft-law consensus body, is limited. The chairmanship rotates between the eight Arctic states, and Norway held the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2006–2008. The priority areas were: integrated resource management, climate change, and the structure of the Arctic Council. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the seven other Arctic Council member states announced on March 3, 2022 that its representatives would not travel to Russia for meetings, and that the member states are “temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.”⁵⁸ Norway took over the chairship again, from Russia, in May 2023.

4 Norwegian foreign and Arctic policy interests and priorities

Norwegian foreign and Arctic policy interests and priorities, as expressed in governmental documents and chairmanship programs, can be divided into three broad categories: 1) international cooperation and the international legal order; 2) business, societal, and knowledge development; and 3) environmental protection and ocean management. Seeing how the foreign policy of smaller states is largely dictated by international structures, Norwegian foreign policy interests and priorities are considered dependent of the international system and in relation to great power interests.

4.1 International cooperation and the international order

International cooperation is pertinent for small states, and Norway has benefited from the rules-based international order that dominated in the post-Cold War era, which is closely related to the international American-led liberal order. The Norwegian government emphasizes the importance of ensuring that UNCLOS provides the basic architecture underpinning all ocean governance in the Arctic, and supporting a multilateral, rules-based international order. The 2017 Arctic Strategy states: “It is important for Norway that there is broad international awareness of, and compliance with, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that the Convention forms the legal basis for the management of the Arctic Sea areas.”⁵⁹ The 2020 Arctic Policy also emphasizes that there is a “well-functioning legal regime in place in the Arctic,” and that “international law applies in the Arctic.”⁶⁰ Thus, the Norwegian government finds support for its interests in the Western international order, and these statements do not necessary comply with the principles and practices of the emerging Russian-led or Chinese-led orders.⁶¹

The Arctic Strategy from 2017 further underscores Norway’s intention to continue dialogue with the EU on Arctic issues. This includes promoting a common understanding of UNCLOS as the legal framework for the Arctic sea areas, achieving balance between conservation and sustainable use, and providing input to the EU’s priority areas for the Arctic.⁶² The 2020 Arctic Policy states that Norway “actively seeks to ensure that the EU’s policy is based as far as possible on knowledge and facts about conditions in the north.”⁶³ As the EU’s attitude towards the Arctic has been a challenge for Norway, it has long been in Norway’s interests to influence the EU’s Arctic policy, in particular concerning maritime issues and fisheries.⁶⁴ The issue of fisheries was challenged following Brexit when the EU granted itself a quota of 28,431 tons of cod for 2021 in the fisheries protection zone. Norway considered this a violation of UNCLOS,⁶⁵ and the dispute gave new life to conflicts over fishing rights around Svalbard.⁶⁶

The 2020 Arctic Policy recognizes the strategic importance of the Arctic, balancing between deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis Russia as a key component of Norwegian security policy, NATO as the cornerstone of Norway’s security, and the US as Norway’s closest ally. Furthermore, the policy discusses Norway’s bilateral relationship with Russia, the EU, and China.⁶⁷ Notably, China is only mentioned with regard to its observer status in the Arctic Council in the 2014 Arctic Policy.⁶⁸ The 2017 Arctic Strategy briefly mentions China in relation to fishing and markets for Norwegian export.⁶⁹ The 2020 Arctic Policy, however, has a sub-chapter on China, and explicitly recognizes China’s growing interest in the Arctic and the need to ensure that cooperation with China in the Arctic is based on respect for international law and within the framework of existing cooperative structures.⁷⁰ This indicates how systemic changes – the rise of China as a global great power – impacts the formulation of Norwegian foreign policy.

Moreover, the international collaborative climate cooled after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and with the economic sanctions from western states that followed. Russian aggression in Europe is thus another indicator of changes at the international system level with an impact on the formulation and conduct of Norwegian foreign and Arctic policy. Bilateral military cooperation between Norway and Russia was suspended in 2014, excluding cooperation in areas of importance to maritime safety, airspace security, and stability in the north, whilst other areas of collaboration were upheld.⁷¹ These included the direct lines of communication between the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Russia’s Northern Fleet, coast guard and border guards cooperation, search-and-rescue collaboration, and the mechanisms that are part of the Incidents at Sea Agreement.⁷²

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – as a historic turning point with implications for the global governance architecture – had even greater impact on Norwegian foreign and Arctic policy. Norway followed the EU in imposing wide-reaching sanctions on Russia.⁷³ This gave Russia a new opportunity to argue that Norway is breaking the Svalbard Treaty,⁷⁴ and to threaten to withdraw from other bilateral agreements between the two states.⁷⁵ The suspension of all diplomacy and cooperation with Russia deprives western states of formal mechanisms to discuss Arctic affairs. Thus, the war against Ukraine has been a severe blow to Arctic cooperation and has exposed the limits of the Arctic regime and the state of complex interdependence among states in the region.⁷⁶ We therefore see that system level developments have spilled over to the Arctic region, and impact small-state Norway’s ability to pursue its objectives and policy in the region. Specifically, the war on the European continent, and upheaval of the liberal international order that has dominated since the end of the Cold War, has implications for a key security policy objective for Norway: to keep the “High North, low tension.”

4.2 Business, societal, and knowledge development

There are also domestic challenges in the Norwegian High North, particularly related to population decline in the northernmost counties,⁷⁷ and on Svalbard.⁷⁸ Thus, the Norwegian government aims to promote “continued strong growth and value creation in North Norway” – an ambition that is connected to the need for a sufficiently large labor force with the necessary skills and knowledge, and the concern about population decline in the northernmost counties.⁷⁹ Priority areas are to foster local and regional business development, job and value creation, and the development of infrastructure. The safeguarding of the livelihoods, traditions, and cultures of Indigenous peoples has also been expressed in Arctic policies and strategies. The overall aim is to ensure that North Norway is an attractive place in which to live.

Moreover, Norway aims to be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the Arctic,⁸⁰ with an expressed interest in developing ocean-based industries, e.g., seafood, oil and gas, and the maritime industry, as these are essential for value creation in the north.⁸¹ The 2020 Arctic Policy describes how oil and gas activities and development projects on the continental shelf open major opportunities for companies and the industry on the mainland, and promote the development of a knowledge-based industrial structure in North Norway.⁸² Thus, the government aims to “facilitate profitable production of oil and gas, (…) to give the industry access to new exploration areas.”⁸³ These are controversial issues, and Norway has received criticism for its petroleum activity, from both national and international actors.⁸⁴ To that end, the 2022 OECD Environmental Performance Review of Norway concluded that, although the country is a frontrunner in many environmental issues, it has a long way to go to reach its 2030 climate targets, and the petroleum and agricultural sectors are particularly criticized.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the 2020 Arctic Policy states that “it will be vital to learn, adapt and lay the foundation for continued green and sustainable growth,” and includes a policy measure to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with national targets and international commitments, and continue initiatives that play a part in reducing greenhouse emissions in the Arctic.”⁸⁶

Accordingly, there are signs of a balancing act taking place concerning energy policy, where the Norwegian government must walk the line between domestic actors adverse to the idea of closing petroleum activity⁸⁷ and its aspiration to be a ‘frontrunner’ in international climate policy.⁸⁸ This duality came into play at the COP-26 meeting in Glasgow in November 2021, where Norwegian prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre promised that Norway would enhance its target to reduce its emissions,⁸⁹ whilst it was also communicated that Norway would not set an end date for phasing out oil and gas.⁹⁰

4.3 Environmental protection and ocean management

The third category pertains to issues related to environmental protection and ocean management, and includes several priorities centered around sustainability, ecosystem-based management, and integrated resource management.⁹¹ The Norwegian government states that it will take a “broad-based approach” to climate change and environmental protection in the Arctic and an “integrated approach to management of the natural environment in North Norway,” and contribute to “integrated ocean management in Norwegian waters.”⁹² These issues are also related to Norway’s engagement in the Arctic Council, through which Norway seeks to play a leading role in the work to combat marine litter and microplastics, and to support the collective goal of reduction of black carbon emissions in the Arctic.⁹³ Norway’s priorities for its 2006–2008 Arctic Council chairmanship were: integrated resource management, climate change, and the structure of the Arctic Council.⁹⁴ Norway took over the chairship of the Arctic Council after Russia in May 2023, and the priority issues for the 2023–2025 period were: the oceans, climate and environment, sustainable economic development, and people in the North. These issues align with the general priorities of the Norwegian government and are in the intersection between domestic and foreign policy.

The ocean is a central theme, which is tightly incorporated into the image Norway seeks to portray abroad. Norway perceives itself as a coastal nation, a peacebuilder, and a small state.⁹⁵ Recurrent themes in Arctic strategies and policies are Norway as a shipping nation and a significant actor in search-and-rescue.⁹⁶ The Norwegian government aims to improve monitoring, emergency response, and maritime safety systems, in close cooperation with Norway’s Nordic neighbors, and previously Russia.⁹⁷

The Norwegian government’s interest in the oceans was boosted with the shift towards ‘the blue economy’ and the launch of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which gave Norway an additional opportunity to position itself as the Arctic Ocean’s “rightful steward” by underscoring its geographical location, cultural-economic history, capacity, and expertise.⁹⁸ The Conservative government established a High-Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy in 2018, aiming to promote sustainable use and value creation, clean and healthy oceans, and the role of the blue economy in development policy.⁹⁹ Such initiatives promote the image of Norway as “an international leader in ocean management,”¹⁰⁰ and bolster the ambition of assuming a leading international role in sustainable resource development and ocean management. Following this initiative, the 2020 Arctic Policy states: “The Norwegian government’s ocean policy focuses on global leadership, clean and productive oceans, business development, knowledge and technology, and sound management.”¹⁰¹ This is an area in which the Norwegian government seeks to assume an international role, while at the same time supporting the domestic ocean industries to promote value creation.

5 Discussion

Schia argues that to understand the role of small states in international politics, it is not enough to look at organizational structures; it is also necessary to understand who does what, with whom, and why.¹⁰² This section discusses how to understand the Norwegian government’s room for maneuver in the international arena, given system level changes, while at the same time attending to domestic priorities. The ambition is to identify what can be learned about small-state behavior in the international arena, given the tools available for such actors when facing asymmetrically larger and more powerful states.¹⁰³

The Norwegian government has ambitions for the High North to become one of Norway’s most sustainable and innovative regions, and the Arctic is also Norway’s most important foreign policy interest area.¹⁰⁴ Norway’s Arctic strategy is therefore an expression of the interplay between foreign and domestic policy, and the conduct of Norway’s foreign and Arctic policy is aptly explained through Putnam’s two-level game. The Norwegian government is aware of its small-state status in international affairs and seeks to take advantage of its soft power and strategic geographical position, in addition to its membership of the NATO alliance and bilateral relationship with the US. This is a challenging balancing act, as its geographical location also poses a threat. As stated by Prime Minster Jonas Gahr Støre: “You cannot choose your geography or neighbors.”¹⁰⁵ This became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, which exposed the limitations of the international structures and rules-based order that Norway has been dependent on, and thus limited the government’s room for maneuver in pursuit of its interests.

The three categories identified above comprise priorities that are intended to serve Norwegian interests in the domestic and international arenas. Regarding the priorities related to international cooperation and the international legal order, the Norwegian government has benefited from the American-led order that has prevailed after the end of the Cold War. These priorities are primarily intended to protect Norwegian sovereignty over its land and ocean territories, and to promote respect for the Law of the Sea and ensure it provides the basic architecture underpinning all ocean governance in the Arctic. This is particularly relevant concerning the EU’s approach to the Arctic, but also considering China’s rise to global power and influence, and expressed interests in the Arctic. The objective of supporting a multilateral, rules-based international order is dominant, and attention is directed toward consolidating Norway’s image as a peace nation in the international arena. This illustrates the balance between small-state realism, and small-state idealism mentioned in the introduction.

Overall, a main foreign policy priority for Norway in the Arctic – across governments on both sides of the political spectrum – is to maintain low tension in the High North. However, as Waltz claims: “Peace is maintained by a delicate balance of internal and external restraints. States having a surplus of power are tempted to use it, and weaker states fear their doing so.”¹⁰⁶ From this premise, Norway is a small state that needs to maneuver among great powers which accentuates the intricate balancing act between reassurance and deterrence regarding Russia. Strengthening cooperation with Russia in the High North has therefore been an overall priority for the Norwegian government. On the other hand, Norway’s defense policy is based on external support should it come under attack,¹⁰⁷ and Norway’s alliance management in NATO is characterized by a fear of US abandonment.¹⁰⁸ However, NATO’s raison d’être was abruptly brought back by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which also incited renewed concerns for security in the Norwegian High North and discussions about the general state of Norway’s armed forces. Accordingly, external factors – and shocks – can spur changes in Norwegian foreign and defense policy, which illustrates how Norway as a small state must react to the actions of great powers.

Another example of this is when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in October 2010 – a decision that caused the Chinese government to respond by freezing political and economic relations with Norway. This included sanctions on imports of fish, and limitations on diplomatic interaction.¹⁰⁹ Kolstad finds that, immediately after the awarding of the peace prize, Norwegian agreement with Chinese voting on UN human rights resolutions increased. This indicates that the Chinese government was effective in utilizing economic sanctions to impact Norwegian foreign policy, as Norway’s Conservative government traded human rights concessions for market access.¹¹⁰

All states must find a balance between different interests and objectives, and towards various actors in the international and domestic arenas. In the case of Norway, this is expressed along several dimensions. First, the balance between reassurance and deterrence with regard to Russia, while also balancing between integrating the US in Norwegian security and preventing the US from becoming too integrally involved on Norwegian soil (which could provoke Russia).¹¹¹ Second, an emerging balancing act for the Norwegian government seems to be protecting the integrity and sovereignty of the Arctic states, while not damaging economic relations with China and access to Chinese markets for salmon exports.

The two categories containing issues related to business development and societal development and environmental protection and emergency preparedness are found in the interplay between the domestic and foreign policy realms. Business and societal development are necessary to promote sustainable communities in North Norway and are therefore directed towards a domestic audience. However, there is also a security dimension related to the population decline/stagnation of the northernmost counties. Enabling companies in North Norway to obtain value creation can therefore serve a twofold purpose for the Norwegian government. The emphasis on economic growth and societal development in the region further aligns Norway with its Nordic neighbors, which is evident from the priority areas in the presidencies of regional bodies of cooperation. However, the economic ambitions of the Norwegian government to implement oil and gas activities and development projects on the continental shelf in the High North¹¹² collide with the aspiration to be a frontrunner in international climate policy.¹¹³

6 Conclusion – Norway as a small state in world politics

The review of Norway’s foreign and Arctic policy illustrates how small states are subject to the will of powerful states in the international system. First, Norway must balance its relationship with Russia with being a NATO member dependent on the US for its security. Engaging the US in the High North has been a key priority for the Norwegian government, which has coincided with efforts to strengthen northern European defense cooperation.¹¹⁴ Whilst there have been concerns about the long-term reliability of US obligations in Europe,¹¹⁵ the Russian war on Ukraine has shown that the US is still committed to contributing to European security – and that Europe is dependent on the US for its defense.¹¹⁶ Second, Norway is a European state outside of the EU, and must manage a constructive relationship with the EU related to resource management, in particular fisheries.

Third, China has yet to operate militarily in the Arctic, but is an emerging great power that is working to facilitate a military and civilian presence in the region.¹¹⁷ Norway must manage its economic relationship with a state whose actions conflict with Norwegian values and human rights concerns. In addition, the foundation for Norwegian security policy is the alliance with the US through NATO, and Norwegian room for maneuver vis-à-vis China is at all times affected by the US’ relationship to China.¹¹⁸ Thus, Norway must balance China’s interests in the Arctic with concerns about this among the other Arctic states. The challenge is not to permit China to penetrate Arctic governance structures, while at the same time upholding a working relationship so that China is not pushed to pursue its Arctic priorities and interests through forums other than the established structures in the region.

The article aims to examine the rationale behind the government’s interests and priorities from a domestic and international perspective. To that end, it has cast light on how Norway – as a small state in international affairs – is dependent on an international legal order. Thus, there is realpolitik reasoning behind the priorities, related to state sovereignty and survival. The best strategy available for a small state like Norway to achieve this goal is bilateral relationships with great powers and alliances,¹¹⁹ exemplified by Norway’s relationship to the US and engagement in NATO, which has been a successful strategy for Norway. Norway’s Arctic policy can be considered an interplay between the domestic and foreign policy realms. Soft power and diplomacy are beneficial strategies available for small states, when maneuvering international relations dominated by great powers.¹²⁰ However, Norway’s ability to pursue its foreign policy interests in the Arctic is not isolated from systemic level change and must be considered in relation to the interests of great powers and relations between them.

Appendix

Table 1 Priority areas in Norwegian High North and Arctic Policies

Document	Year	Priority areas
The Norwegian Government’s Strategy for the High North	2006	• Exercise its authority in the High North in a credible, consistent, and predictable way • Be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the High North • Be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High North • Provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, and seek to ensure that these activities boost competence in Norway in general and in North Norway in particular, and foster local and regional business development • Ensure that the High North policy plays a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions, and cultures of Indigenous peoples in the High North • Further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North • Strengthen cooperation with Russia
New Building Blocks in the North	2009	• Develop knowledge about climate and the environment in the High North • Improve monitoring, emergency response, and maritime safety systems in northern waters • Promote sustainable development of offshore petroleum and renewable marine resources • Promote onshore business development • Further develop the infrastructure in the north • Continue to firmly exercise sovereignty, and strengthen cross-border cooperation in the north • Safeguard the culture and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples
Norway’s Arctic Policy	2014	• International cooperation • Business development • Knowledge development • Infrastructure • Environmental protection and emergency preparedness
Arctic Strategy	2017	• Well-functioning international cooperation with Arctic neighbors • Sustainable business development • Knowledge-based development of the Arctic • Infrastructure in accordance with growth and the green transition • Ensuring a responsible approach to environmental protection, safety, and emergency preparedness and response
The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy. People, Opportunities, and Norwegian Interests in the North.	2020	• Peace, stability, and predictability • International cooperation and the international legal order • Integrated, ecosystem-based management • Increased job creation and value creation • Closer cooperation between the business sector and knowledge institutions • Effective welfare schemes, and ensuring that North Norway is an attractive place to live

Footnotes

1. Wrenn Yennie Lindgren and Nina Græger, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North,” in Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, eds Michael Wesley (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, The Australian National University, 2017): 92.
2. Jonas Gahr Støre, “The Prime Minister’s Speech about the High North Policy,” Speech delivered at UiT – the Arctic University of Norway, 1 February 2022. Accessed October 21, 2022. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/statsministerens-tale-om-nordomarepolitikken/id2900162/
3. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities The main features of Norwegian foreign policy.” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008): 47.
4. Ibid., 48.
5. Rolf Tamnes, “Småstatsrealisme i 70 år,” Internasjonal Politikk 77 (2019): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/intpol.v77.1617
6. Trine Flockhart, “The coming multi-order world,” Contemporary Security Policy 37 (2016): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1150053; John Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” International Affairs 94 (2018): 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241
7. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities”: 47.
8. Jo Inge Bekkevold, “Norges relasjon med Kina I 70 år: Småstatsidealisme og realisme I møte med en stormakt,” Internasjonal politikk 79 (2021): 68. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/intpol.v79.2574
9. Trine Flockhart and Elana A. Korosteleva, “War in Ukraine: Putin and the multi-order world,” Contemporary Security Policy 43: 466–481. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591
10. Ibid., 467.
11. Ibid., 471.
12. John Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43 (2019): 7–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00342. See also Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?”
13. Bekkevold, “Norges relasjon med Kina”: 66.
14. In Norwegian, one speaks of both the Arctic (referring to the Arctic Ocean and uninhabited territories of the High Arctic), and the High North. The latter being a uniquely Norwegian phenomenon, defined as the more hospitable and populated areas of northern Norway and Svalbard, and the adjacent maritime and land areas in the European part of the Arctic. See: Odd Gunnar Skagestad, “The ‘High North’ An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy,” FNI Report 10/2010. Accessed October 27, 2022, https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/131978-1469869945/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1010.pdf
15. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail.”
16. Flockhart and Korosteleva, “War in Ukraine.”
17. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International politics (Waveland Press, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43 (2019): 11. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00342
18. Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North. (Ad notam forlag, 1991).
19. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Proposisjon til Stortinget 14S. Evne til forsvar – vilje til beredskap. Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren,” (2020): 20.
20. Tom Long, A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics: 14.
21. Ibid., 46.
22. Long, A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics: 13; 39; 60.
23. Ibid., 52.
24. Ibid., 52.
25. Ibid., 52–53.
26. Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 104. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996
27. Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and domestic politics: A review essay,” International Security 17 (1992): 177–198. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539162
28. Håvard Leira, ”Drømmen om en ny utenrikspolitikk,” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 4 (2012): 382–393.
29. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988): 427–460.
30. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”: 434.
31. Ibid.
32. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 289–313.
33. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”: 435.
34. Ibid., 440.
35. Helge Blakkisrud, “Introduction: Can Cooperative Arctic Policies Survive the Current Crisis in Russian- Western Relations?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 9 (2018): 378.
36. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s Strategy for the High North,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). Accessed, October 21, 2021, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/strategy-for-the-high-north/id448697/
37. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Opportunities and Challenges in the North,” Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-30-2004-2005-/id407537/
38. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Opportunities and Challenges in the North.”
39. Andreas Østhagen, “Norway’s Arctic policy: Still High North, Low Tension?” The Polar Journal 11 (2021): 75–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2021.1911043
40. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s Strategy for the High North”: 18.
41. Ibid.,18.
42. Ibid., 13.
43. Ibid., 14–15.
44. Elana Wilson Rowe, “Analyzing frenemies: An Arctic repertoire of cooperation and rivalry,” Political Geography 76 (2020): 2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102072
45. Ibid.
46. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New Building Blocks in the North. The Next Step in the Government’s High North Strategy,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/north_blocks/id548803/
47. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The High North Initiative – Status October 2010,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nordomradesatsingen---status-oktober-201/id620374/
48. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The High North – Visions and Strategies,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/high_north_visions_strategies/id664906/
49. Østhagen, “Norway’s Arctic policy”: 81.
50. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/nordkloden/id2076193/
51. Norwegian Ministries, “Arctic Strategy,” Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, Office of the Prime Minister (2017). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/arctic-strategy/id2550081/
52. Norwegian Ministries, “Arctic Strategy”: 18.
53. Norwegian Ministries, “New Growth, Proud History. The Norwegian Government’s Ocean Strategy,” Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2017). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/00f5d674cb684873844bf3c0b19e0511/the-norwegian-governments-ocean-strategy---new-growth-proud-history.pdf
54. Norwegian Ministries, “New Growth, Proud History”: 13.
55. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy. People, Opportunities and Norwegian Interests in the Arctic,” Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Office of the Prime Minister (2020). Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/arctic_policy/id2830120/
56. Wilson Rowe, “Analyzing frenemies”: 2.
57. Ibid.
58. US Department of State, “Temporarily Pausing Participation in all Meetings of the Council and its Subsidiary Bodies,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, 3 March 2022. Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/
59. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy”: 20.
60. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 2, 11.
61. Flockhart and Korosteleva, “War in Ukraine”: 469–470.
62. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy”: 20.
63. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 21.
64. Njord Wegge, “Small State, Maritime Great Power? Norway’s Strategies for Influencing the Maritime Policy of the European Union,” Marine Policy 35 (2011): 338.
65. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Note Verbale to the EU, 8 February 2021,” Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/83930993ec23456092199fcc9ed9de51/note-til-eu-torsk.pdf
66. Hilde-Gunn Bye, “Norway objects to the EU’s Granting Cod Quotas in the Svalbard Zone,” High North News, February, 16, 2021. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/norway-objects-eus-granting-cod-quotas-svalbard-zone
67. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 16–22.
68. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy”: 11.
69. Norwegian Ministries, “Arctic Strategy”: 20.
70. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 22.
71. Ibid., 32.
72. Ibid., 19.
73. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, “Sanctions Against Russia Incorporated into Norwegian Law,” Press Release, 18 March 2022. Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/russia_sanctions/id2904511/
74. Atle Staalesen. “Top Russian Legislators Question Norwegian Sovereignty Over Svalbard.” The Barents Observer, June 29, 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/life-and-public/2022/06/top-russian-legislators-question-norwegian-sovereignty-over-svalbard
75. Thomas Nilsen, “Duma Speaker Instructs Foreign Affairs Committee to Review Barents Sea Delimitation Treaty.” The Barents Observer, July 5, 2022, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/borders/2022/07/duma-speaker-instructs-foreign-affairs-committee-review-barents-sea-delimitation
76. Michael Byers, “Crisis and international cooperation: An Arctic case study,” International Relations 31 (2017): 375–402. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817735680
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79. Norwegian Ministries, “Arctic Strategy”: 23.
80. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s Strategy for the High North”: 8.
81. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy”: 23.
82. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 32–33.
83. Ibid., 34.
84. Berit Kristoffersen and Stephen Young, “Geographies of Security and Statehood in Norway’s ‘Battle of the North,” Geoforum 41 (2010): 583. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.11.006
85. OECD, “OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Norway 2022,” OECD Environmental Performance Reviews. Paris, OECD Publishing (2022) https://doi.org/10.1787/59e71c13-en
86. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 33, 28.
87. Camilla Houeland and David Jordhus-Lier, “Not my Task’: Role Perceptions in a Green Transition Among Shop Stewards in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry,” Journal of Industrial Relations (2022). https://doi.org/10.1177/00221856211068500
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89. Norwegian Office of the Prime Minister, “Statement at the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow,” Speech by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. COP26, Glasgow, Scotland, 2 November 2021. Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/statement-at-the-un-climate-change-conference-in-glasgow/id2882242/
90. Silje Lundberg, “Will Norway’s New Government Consider Phasing out Oil and Gas?” Energy Post, September, 28, 2021. https://energypost.eu/will-norways-new-government-consider-phasing-out-oil-and-gas/
91. Norwegian Ministries, “Arctic Strategy”: 15.
92. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 26–27.
93. Ibid., 28.
94. Government of Norway, “Norwegian Chairmanship Programme 2006–2008,” Arctic Council, 2006. Accessed October 21, 2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2472
95. Benjamin de Carvalho and Ivar B. Neumann. Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
96. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’s Arctic Policy”.
97. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 38.
98. Berit Kristoffersen and Phil Steinberg, “Building a Blue Economy in the Arctic Ocean: Sustaining the Sea or Sustaining the State?” in Politics of sustainability in the Arctic: reconfiguring identity, space, and time, eds. Ulrik Pram Gad and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018): 136–148.
99. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister Erna Solberg Launches High-Level Panel on Building a Sustainable Ocean Economy,” 30 January 2018. Accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.norway.no/en/thailand/norway-region/news-events/news2/prime-minister-erna-solberg-launches-high-level-panel-on-building-a-sustainable-ocean-economy/
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101. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 9.
102. Niels Nagelhus Schia, “Being Part of the Parade – “Going Native” in the United Nations Security Council,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 36 (2013): 138–156.
103. Long, A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics.
104. Lindgren and Græger, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies”: 107–108.
105. Støre, “The Prime Minister’s Speech about the High North Policy”
106. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 55 (2000): 13.
107. Rolf Tamnes, “The High North: A Call for A Competitive Strategy,” in Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue. Whitehall Paper series, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Routledge, 2018): 8–22.
108. Tormod Heier, “Avoiding War: How Should Northern Europe Respond to the US-Russian Rivalry?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 9 (2018): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1218
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110. Ibid., 209.
111. Heier, “Avoiding War”: 278–280.
112. Norwegian Ministries, “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy”: 32.
113. Lahn and Wilson Rowe, “How to be a “Front-Runner”: 126–145.
114. Lindgren and Græger, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies”: 109.
115. Hugo Meijer and Stephen G. Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back,” International Security 45 (2021): 7–8.
116. Steven Erlanger, “ When It Comes to Building Its Own Defense, Europe Has Blinked,” The New York Times, February 4, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/04/world/europe/europe-defense-ukraine-war.html
117. The Norwegian Intelligence Service, “Focus 20222,” accessed February 1, 2023. https://www.forsvaret.no/aktuelt-og-presse/publikasjoner/fokus
118. Bekkevold, “Norges relasjon med Kina”: 67.
119. Long, A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics.
120. Waltz, Theory of International politics.